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ADAM SMITH’S ESSENTIALS: ON TRUST,
FAITH, AND FREE MARKETS
BY
JERRY EVENSKY
When trust is shaken, individuals pull back and the market system contracts.
Where trust grows, individual energy and creativity are unleashed and the
system grows. In Adam Smith’s vision of humankind’s progress, trust is the central
theme.
The Great Recession represents a classic case of a crisis of trust. Looking back
to the work of Smith offers insight into the role of citizens and the State in creating
an fruitful market environment based on trust, and the challenge of this process,
given the human frailty of individuals (unfortunately, we are not angels) and the
potential for State power to be captured and abused.
I. SMITH ON TRUST AND FAITH—AN INTRODUCTION
‘‘Trust’’ and ‘‘faith’’ are not words commonly associated with Adam Smith. More
often one hears his name along with the terms ‘‘self-interest,’’ ‘‘laissez-faire,’’ and
most famously the ‘‘invisible hand’’ (The Wealth of Nations (hereafter WN), p. 456).
In the stories told of Smith’s vision, the energy that sparks individual effort derives
from self-interest, the freedom of choice afforded by laissez-faire liberates that
energy, and the magical working of markets guided by the invisible hand makes this
unleashed energy most productive of the wealth of nations.
These associations are not incorrect. In Smith’s analysis self-interest is the source
of the energy that drives each individual in the ‘‘hope of bettering his condition’’
(WN, p. 99). The ‘‘unbounded freedom’’ (WN, p. 833) afforded by laissez-faire
is essential if that individual energy is to be unleashed. Markets can seem magical
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in their ability to coordinate the labors of the legions of autonomous individuals who
have a hand in bringing such things as a simple ‘‘woolen coat . . . which covers
the day labourer’’ (WN, p. 22) to the market.1 But in the story Smith tells, this
energy is unleashed by human freedom in almost magical ways . . . only where trust
prevails.
As defined here, ‘‘trust’’ is empirically based and probabilistic. We trust to
a degree consistent with our perception of the available evidence. In human
interaction we trust individuals and institutions to the degree that they have, over
time, proved trustworthy. Faith is a leap beyond the rational calculus of probabilistic
trust to belief without doubt.
If all individuals were angels we could take it on faith, no evidence—no
probabilistic calculus necessary—that in all market interactions (indeed, in all
interactions) we are dealing with individuals whose behavior is constrained by the
rules of justice. In this case the ‘‘transaction cost[s]’’ (Williamson 2000, p. 599)
associated with protecting oneself from the risk of immoral or unethical behavior
would be zero, for there is no such risk when dealing with angels. In this ideal world,
laissez-faire makes perfect sense, because it’s a perfect world. But in Adam Smith’s
analysis, this is a normative limit, an ideal to which we compare the real. In
Smith’s real analysis we leave the realm of faith and the issue becomes trust. When
engaged in the market we must ask ourselves: To what degree can we trust the
integrity of the other individual(s) involved in a potential market exchange? To the
degree that our trust diminishes, the transaction costs associated with protecting
ourselves from the risk of immoral or unethical behaviors rise.
Every market interaction involves a probabilistic calculus of the perceived risk so
that the transaction costs can be assessed. This is a challenge in an intimate society.
It is a daunting challenge in the global market system. In that larger economic system,
one is unlikely to have direct information on the trustworthiness of the other parties
involved, so in a laissez-faire environment, one must resort to proxies: risk
assessments by others who, in turn, must themselves be assessed for risk. As the
layers of this risk information filtering get thicker, the sources of the information
move from almost transparent to almost opaque. In a complex economic system, we
are often making risk assessments from behind something approaching an opaque
‘‘veil of uncertainty’’ (Buchanan 1991, p. 47)—we can’t be sure how to assess the
risk assessment, much less the risk. This opaqueness of risk in a world in which
1Smith offers this wonderfully powerful example to represent the amazing complexity of the market
coordination required to produce an item that we see as so very ordinary and mundane:
Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilised and
thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whose industry a part,
though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all
computation. The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and
rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The
shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner,
the weaver, the fuller, the dresser . . . (WN, pp. 22–23).
His list of the hands involved goes on for the better part of a page.
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the only rule is caveat emptor makes for dangerous going,2 but Smith believed it need
not be so.
In Smith’s analysis the establishment of a system of positive laws and the
institutions to implement and enforce those laws provide an imperfect but potentially
constructive solution to assessing risk in a world of less than angels. Establishing
rules of justice and ensuring that the alignment of institutional incentives encourages
individuals to follow those rules, no matter the individuals’ ethics or lack thereof,
reduces risk. To the degree this ‘‘[p]olice’’ (LJB3, p. 389; i.e., regulation) of market
interactions increases trust, transaction costs are lowered and a wider, more
productive market engagement is encouraged. To the degree that socialization of
individuals as citizens inculcates ‘‘a sense of duty’’ (Theory of Moral Sentiments
(hereafter, TMS), pp. 161–162) to the set of civic ethics embodied in these positive
laws,4 individuals can be trusted to police their own behavior and the policing role
of government, and thus the cost of community-based enforcement is reduced.5
Ideally one has faith in fellow citizens . . . in reality, one has trust. The weaker our
trust, the greater the transaction costs, and the more constrained the market.
Government can increase trust and reduce this cost by setting standards for market
interaction and aligning incentives (including punishment) so that individuals are
more likely to follow those standards. In this role government does not micro-manage
individual choice; it sets boundaries on the range of choice. In the terms of James
Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics, this represents the government’s setting
and enforcing the rules of the game within which all strategies are fair play for the
players in the game. Within this rule-bound game, creative pursuit of market success
can be wonderfully rewarding for the individual and for society.
2All the more so given that many individuals don’t assess even clear risk accurately, tending to see their
own prospects as a better bet than the clear odds:
That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the universal success of
lotteries. The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery; or one in which
the whole gain compensated the whole loss; because the undertaker could make nothing by
it.. . . The vain hope of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of this demand.. . .
There is not, however, a more certain proposition in mathematics than that the more tickets you
adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a loser. Adventure upon all the tickets in the
lottery, and you lose for certain; and the greater the number of your tickets the nearer you
approach to this certainty (WN, pp. 122, 125).
‘‘[T]he confidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle upon which is
founded the success of all lotteries. . .’’ (WN, p. 918).
3There are two sets of Lectures on Jurisprudence from Adam Smith. The earlier of these is referred to as
‘‘Report of 1762-3’’ and the other as ‘‘Report dated 1766’’. Following standard usage I will reference the
first as LJA and the second as LJB.
4‘‘The regard to those general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a sense of duty, a principle of
the greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable
of directing their actions.. . . [U]pon the tolerable observance of these duties, depends the very existence
of human society, which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with
a reverence for those important rules of conduct’’ (TMS, pp. 161–162, 163).
5See Evensky (2005, ch. 2, 3, 4) for a detailed discussion of Smith’s analysis of the development of civic
values and citizenship, and the importance of this dynamic for the progress of society.
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II. SMITH ON TRUST AND THE EMERGENCE OF MARKETS
Smith envisions humankind as evolving through four stages of progress. This
dynamic begins in the ‘‘rude state’’ (WN, p. 276) of hunting and gathering, and
successively passes through a stage of pasturage and then agriculture until it reaches
what is, according to Smith, the final and most mature stage: that of a free-market,
commercial society. Much of Smith’s work is dedicated to tracing the history of this
four-stage progress of humankind with an eye toward culling from that history
the principles that make progress possible. If there is one constant principle,
according to Smith, that must always and at every transition from stage to stage be
established for this stepwise progress to proceed, it is the establishment of a system
of institutional structures and individual ethics that is consistent with the trust
necessary for society to cohere in an increasingly complex form.
A hunting and gathering society is very small because the available means of
subsistence are severely limited. In that small community the potential violations of trust
are similarly limited. They are most often related to personal injury and insult because
‘‘[a]mong savages property begins and ends with possession, and they seem scarce to have
any idea of anything as their own which is not about their own bodies’’ (LJB, p. 460).
Given the intimacy of this society, trust is policed first and foremost by the
individuals themselves. If one feels unjustly treated, this engenders resentment, and
the punishment comes in the form of revenge. A mutual understanding that revenge is
the sanction for violations of trust encourages self-policing, which, in turn, increases the
probability of trust. But even in this rude state, a rudimentary system of institutional
police emerges in the form of tribal councils that adjudicate conflicts. These emerge in
order to diminish the potential chaos of total vigilante justice. In his analysis of this very
first stage of humankind’s progress, we see Smith begin to develop a theme that is the
constant in his modeling of a constructive human society: ‘‘Order and good
government’’ (WN, p. 405) that ensure that rules of justice are defined and enforced
are essential for mutual trust among citizens. This trust is the sine qua non for social
cohesion. Absent this trust, a society will degenerate into a war of all against all.
Society . . . cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure
one another. The moment that injury begins, the moment that mutual resentment and
animosity take place, all the bands of it are broke asunder, and the different members
of which it consisted are, as it were, dissipated and scattered abroad by the violence
and opposition of their discordant affections. If there is any society among robbers
and murderers, they must at least, according to the trite observation, abstain from
robbing and murdering one another.. . . Society may subsist, though not in the most
comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly
destroy it.. . . Justice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice [of society].
If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society . . . must in a moment
crumble into atoms (TMS, p. 86).
The second stage of humankind’s progress is that of pasturage. Complexity
increases in this second stage because ‘‘[a]mong shepherds the idea of property is
further extended’’ (LJB, p. 460). ‘‘Those animalls which are most adapted for the use
of man ... are no longer common but are the property of certain individualls. The
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distinctions of rich and poor then arise’’ (LJA, p. 202). Given the inculcation of a sense of
duty, most individuals in society can be trusted to honor the property rights of others, but
not all. Where personal trust ends, there must be a mechanism to ensure the trust of
property owners that their possessions are secure. Absent that, they would have to incur
very high, unproductive costs of securing their property or there would be chaos. Thus
this emergence of significant private property ‘‘makes it [government] absolutely
necessary.... [for property is] the grand fund of all dispute ...’’ (LJA, p. 208).
The third, agricultural, stage of humankind’s progress can sustain a much larger
population because the production of the means of subsistence is greatly expanded.
It is also in this agricultural stage that ‘‘property receives its greatest extension’’ (LJB,
p. 460). This expansion of society and of the complexity of the issues within that
society means it is no longer sufficient for the system of positive law to be ‘‘very
short . . . [with] few distinctions in it, so that every man would understand it without
any written or regular law’’ (LJA, p. 213). ‘‘Written and formall laws are a very
great refinement of government’’ (LJA, p. 213) and, due to the complexity of
expanding property rights issues, it is in the stage of agriculture that the
institutionalization of a system of formal positive law is established.
Absent these institutions, the potential for dispute and injury expands significantly
and society can degenerate into constant conflict. Where institutions emerge to
ensure trust and security, progress is possible.
The central theme of Smith’s four stages of analysis is clear: Without trust there
can be no progress.
III. SMITH ON TRUST IN A COMMERCIAL MARKET SYSTEM
For Smith, commerce is the most advanced stage of humankind’s progress because
a healthy commercial market system provides the greatest wealth for the nation and
thus the greatest capacity to enhance the well-being of society.6 If the nature of the
wealth that provides this well-being is the fruits of production,7 the cause of this
wealth is a growing capital stock to finance expanding commerce.8 Capital is the
sine qua non of commercial progress, and trust is essential for capital.
6His metric of that well-being is the condition of the least among the working class:
Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great
political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded
as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the
far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who
feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce
of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged (WN, p. 96).
7‘‘Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so
perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it’’ (WN, p. 660).
8Smith believed in the importance of capital but he was concerned about what I refer to (Evensky 2005)
as the ‘‘quandary of capital.’’ ‘‘This quandary can best be described as follows: The accumulation of the
capital necessary for the progress of opulence . . . seems to give rise to a class of accumulators who, being
few in number, enjoy a concentration of control over capital that empowers them to extort market
advantages, either directly or through government, in pursuit of greater returns on their capital’’ (p. 289).
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Clearly, there is no incentive to accumulate capital if that stock is at all times
vulnerable to the whim and power of individuals and institutions that feel no constraint
in taking it. The emergence of accumulation depends, therefore, on trust that this
accumulated wealth will be secure. The constraints of civic ethics and positive law are
the only barriers that stand between one’s wealth and its loss to unconstrained greed.9
In an expanding commercial market system populated by less than angels,
government alone is not a sufficient constraint. Creative and dynamic commerce
depends on individuals’ freedom of choice. If, in a free society, individuals’ choices
are unconstrained by civic ethics, the expansion of government policing necessary to
enforce appropriate constraints would turn that free society into a police state. Only
where most individuals follow the dictates of civic ethics can the role of government
police be lightly measured to constrain the unethical few.
But government itself must do this measuring. If those who control these powerful
institutions are not themselves constrained by civic ethics, the power of government
can be captured for the very purpose it is ideally established to police: unconstrained
greed. We will return to this challenge of government below. Our point here is that
in Smith’s analysis, the success of a commercial free-market system depends on the
citizens’ trust that their fellow citizens are generally good citizens and that
government will provide the police to discourage destructive behavior of those few
who are not so good. Absent that trust, there would be no incentive to build the
foundation of commerce: capital accumulation.
This trust that accumulation is secure is necessary but not sufficient for commerce.
Having wealth to invest does not mean that one will, in fact, invest it. Smith
envisioned investment as committing one’s capital to a circuit of production.10
Indeed, accumulated wealth only becomes capital in Smith’s analysis when it is
engaged in this self-expanding circuit. Outside the circuit it is used for current
consumption or it lays idle as ‘‘dead stock’’ (WN, p. 320).
Of the capital one commits to the circuit of production, some is still close at hand.
This is fixed capital. Some leaves one’s hands upon commitment. This is circulating
capital. There are risks in both cases. A barn might burn down. A ship might be lost at
sea. But the risks with circulating capital involve an added dimension of trust, for
circulating capital passes through the hands of others. One’s willingness to give
control over that capital to others must certainly be a function of one’s trust in the
security of that wealth one has unleashed. Consider money, for example, as a ‘‘part of
the circulating capital of a society. . .’’ (WN, p. 288).
When gold and silver emerged as a medium of exchange, it became necessary to establish
some expedient to ascertain with accuracy both weight and fitness. Coinage most
effectualy secures both these. The public, finding how much it would tend to
9It should be noted, as we will see below, that taxes are not, by definition, government greed. Responsible
government fiscal policy to provide appropriate services warrants taxation, and among Smith’s principles
for appropriate tax policy, he writes that when the expenses are on account of ‘‘the general benefit of the
whole society [, i]t is reasonable . . . that they should be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole
society, all the different members contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective
abilities’’ (WN, p. 814).
10See Evensky (2005, ch. 6) for a detailed discussion of Smith’s circuit of production analysis.
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facilitate commerce, put a stamp upon certain pieces, that whoever saw them might
have the public faith [trust, as we define the terms here] that they were of a certain
weight and fitness; and this would be what was at first marked upon the coin, as
being of most importance (LJB, pp. 500–501).
Here again we see the essential role of government in warranting trust.
With the emergence of credit, the problem of trust expanded from the credibility of
the currency itself to the credibility of the banks and their customers.
A private man who lends out his money to perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of
debtors, may, either by himself or his agents, observe and enquire both constantly
and carefully into the conduct and situation of each of them. But a banking company,
which lends money to perhaps five hundred different people, and of which the
attention is continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no
regular information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the greater part of
its debtors beyond what its own books afford it (WN, p. 306).
To ensure the creditworthiness of their customers, Scottish banks traditionally required
‘‘frequent and regular payments’’ (WN, p. 305) upon the account, these frequent and
regular payments being one way to monitor the solvency of those customers.
As for the importance of the banks’ trustworthiness, their issuing of bank notes
can leverage productivity (WN, p. 292) when they are trusted (WN, p. 296). Smith
makes the point that Scotland benefited from this banking innovation, but he notes
that it ‘‘required an act of Parliament to regulate it’’ (WN, p. 297). Smith appreciated
the value of a vibrant banking system creating credit for commerce.
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part of
that capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the most judicious
operations of banking can increase the industry of a country.. . . The judicious
operations of banking, by substituting paper in room of a great part of . . . [the
nation’s stock of] gold and silver, enables the country to convert a great part of this
dead stock into active and productive stock; into stock that produces something for
the country. The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may very
properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market
all the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The
judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so violent
a metaphor, a sort of wagon-way through the air; enable the country to convert, as it
were, a great part of its highways into green pastures and corn fields, and thereby to
increase very considerably the annual produce of its land and labour. The commerce
and industry of the country, however, it must be acknowledged, though they may be
somewhat augmented, cannot be altogether so secure, when they are as thus, as it
were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money, as when they travel
about upon the solid ground of gold and silver (WN, pp. 320, 321).
A banking system facilitates commerce, but, as Smith’s ‘‘Daedalian wings’’ image
makes clear, he understood that this innovation was not without significant risks.
He advocated for banking regulation (WN, p. 329) because of the constant danger that
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‘‘bold projectors’’ (WN, p. 304) would exploit access to credit for unscrupulous
schemes.
To the ethical, prudent businessperson, ‘‘[t]he coffers of the bank . . . resemble
a water pond, from which, though a stream is continually running out, yet another is
continually running in, fully equal to that which runs out; so that, without any further
care or attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little or no
expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a bank’’ (WN,
p. 304). But the activity of imprudent and/or unethical projectors can exploit this
access to credit, draining the bank of resources and endangering its solvency.
Smith cites as an example ‘‘[t]he practice of drawing and re-drawing’’ (WN,
p. 308) bills of exchange. This is, in effect, rolling over notes to cover prior notes.
By ‘‘drawing and re-drawing upon one another . . . [and] discount[ing] their bills
sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with another’’ (WN, p. 311), such
schemers can draw a great deal of credit from a bank. If a ‘‘great circle of projectors’’
is involved, it is ‘‘as difficult as possible to distinguish between a real or fictitious bill
of exchange; between a bill drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for
which there was properly no real creditor but the bank which discounted it; nor any
real debtor but the projector who made use of the money’’ (WN, p. 312). This scheme
becomes a trap for the bank because even if discovered, it is dangerous for the bank to
stop lending. Refusing to continue to feed the beast can bring the entire scheme
crashing down and take the bank down with it.
This kind of scheme can be avoided by responsible assessment, and mitigation, of
risk by banks. Smith writes that ‘‘[t]raders and other undertakers may, no doubt, with
great propriety, carry on a very considerable part of their projects with borrowed
money. In justice to their creditors, however, their own capital ought, in this case, be
sufficient to ensure, if I may say so, the capital of those creditors. . .’’ (WN, p. 307).
But as Smith demonstrates, banks have a history of less than careful, responsible
behavior.11 Since a failure of the banking system is a public calamity, Smith felt it
was absolutely both reasonable and responsible for government to police banking in
order to ensure the public trust in the banking system.
On the regulation of banking,12 Smith writes:
Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a violation of
natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which
might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by
the laws of all governments; of the most free, as well as of the most despotical. The
obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is
a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the
banking trade which are here proposed (WN, p. 324).
11Smith presents an extended analysis of the crisis caused by the Ayr Bank (WN, pp. 313–315). ‘‘The
operations of this bank . . . aggravated in the long-run the distress which those projectors had brought both
upon themselves and upon their country’’ (WN, p. 315).
12The particular issue he is discussing in this context is small-denomination paper, which he believes the
government should not allow.
256 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
With each new stage of human progress, the context varies, but Smith’s theme is
constant. If commerce is to be constructive, every participant must enjoy a high
degree of trust that every other participant is following rules designed for
a constructive process. That trust begins with confidence in the civic ethics of the
other participants, but such ethics are not impeccable, nor are they verifiable or
enforceable. To the degree that opaqueness of privately accessible information makes
trust problematic, the verification and/or the enforcement of ethical behavior must
ultimately come from police by government.
IV. SMITH ON THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNMENT—FACTION AND
CAPTURE OF THE ‘‘POLICE’’
Smith recognized that while government is essential, it is problematic. All too often
the power of government to set the rules is captured by those whose goal is not
constructive competition but competitive advantage. In modern terms, competition
for control over government rule setting and enforcement becomes a rent-seeking
game (Buchanan et al., 1980) played by factions that capture policy for their narrow,
self-referential definition of ‘‘the good’’: ‘‘Even to the great Judge of the universe,
they [(the members of a faction)] impute all their own prejudices, and often view that
Divine Being as animated by all their own vindictive and implacable passions. Of all
the corrupters of moral sentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticism have always
been by far the greatest’’ (TMS, p. 156).
For Smith, the factional scourge of Britain in his own day was the followers of the
‘‘Mercantile System’’ (WN, p. 642). This faction advocated with the ‘‘passionate
confidence of interested falsehood’’ (WN, p. 496) for policies that were nominally
designed to increase the wealth of the nation but were, in fact, intended to
monopolize the channels of trade (especially with the American colonies) to the
advantage of the very merchants and manufacturers who were advising the
government on the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. ‘‘Of the greater part
of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the merchants who carry it on, it must
be observed, have been the principal advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if, in
the greater part of them, their interest has been more considered than either that of the
colonies or that of the mother country’’ (WN, p. 584).
As the returns to this monopoly increased, so too increased the resources and in
turn the power of this mercantile faction to have its voice heard and to extinguish the
voices of those who resisted its advocacy.
This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of them,
that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the
government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of
parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is sure to
acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and
influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great
importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority
enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the
highest rank, nor the greatest publick services can protect him from the most
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infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real
danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists
(WN, p. 471).
Proposals of merchants and manufacturers should, according to Smith,
be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having
been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the
most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never
exactly the same with that of the publick, who have generally an interest to deceive
and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions,
both deceived and oppressed it (WN, p. 267).
This infection of faction was, Smith believed, a potentially fatal disease that, if not
treated, would destroy the British system of free people and free markets. It was
diverting the flow of capital from the many channels to which it would naturally flow
into those few most easily monopolized arteries of trade. This engorged those
arteries, creating a risk of ‘‘rupture’’ (WN, p. 605) with potentially catastrophic
consequences. This risk and the expenses of maintaining this monopoly13 were borne
not by the beneficiaries of the monopoly but by society as a whole.
Smith was concerned about faction and government policy distortion as he wrote
The Wealth of Nations at his home in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, from 1767 to 1773. These
concerns became much more keen when he traveled to London in 1773 to have his
book published. He expected this to be completed within months of his arrival in
London, but it was delayed until 1776.14 Much of this delay was due to revisions he
made to the manuscript as he learned first-hand at the seat of government (‘‘inside
the beltway’’ as we might say today) of the dramatic power of the mercantile
faction.15 Indicative of his passion for addressing this issue is the trajectory of his
career and his writing after the initial publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776.16
Financially well set for life, Smith nevertheless actively pursued a position as
a Commissioner of Customs. He sought this position because he wanted to learn more
about the mercantile faction’s strategies. The Customs position offered him first-hand
access to the dynamics of the mercantilists’ policy influence.
Based on his experience at Customs, in 1784 Smith published ‘‘Additions and
Corrections’’ to The Wealth of Nations. The most significant of these was an entirely
new chapter titled ‘‘Conclusion of the Mercantile System’’ (WN, p. 642). This chapter
13See Evensky (2005, ch. 9) for a discussion of Smith’s analysis of the consequences of the huge public
debt accumulated by the British government in the wars fought to protect the interests of the mercantile
faction.
14On 3 September 1772 Smith writes to Sir William Pulteny: ‘‘My book would have been ready for the
Press by the beginning of this winter; but for interruptions . . . [that] will oblige me to retard its
publication for a few months longer’’ (Correspondence, p. 164). In fact it took years, not months, to
complete it.
15Smith spends many pages laying out the design of an optimal tax scheme for internationally traded
goods to maximize revenue while at the same time eliminating barriers for the sake of monopoly, making
trade more fluid, and discouraging smuggling—much of this written in London, as is clear from
references to the year 1775 in the text. See, for example, WN, pp. 888, 896, 917, 923, 937.
16For more on the evolution of Smith’s work described in what follows, see Evensky (2005, ch. 8).
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is a sharply damning, well-documented critique of the distortions created by the
self-serving policies implemented at the behest of the mercantilists.
But most significant for the role of trust we are exploring here is his last work.
In 1790, the year he died, Smith published a revised edition of the Theory of Moral
Sentiments. The most significant change was an entirely new part titled ‘‘Of the
Character of Virtue.’’ It was written at least in part to appeal to leaders of the future to
move beyond faction and to guide policy not by the partial interest of faction, but for
the common interests of the citizenry.
Clearly, he wrote, ‘‘particular orders and societies’’ are going to emerge in every
country. The challenge facing the leader seeking to serve the common good is to create
an order within which the ‘‘powers, privileges, and immunities’’ of the ‘‘particular orders
and societies’’ are balanced such that there is no privileged faction (TMS, p. 230).
‘‘[U]pon the particular distribution which has been made of their respective
powers, privileges, and immunities, depends, what is called, the constitution of that
particular state’’ (TMS, p. 230). This ‘‘constitution’’ inevitably represents both
a delicate and a contestable balance of interests. This is especially so ‘‘in times of
public discontent, faction, and disorder’’ (TMS, p. 231). It is in just such times that the
nation needs a wise leader who will govern for the common good.
In times of civil discord, the leaders of the contending parties, though they may be
admired by one half of their fellow-citizens, are commonly execrated by the other.. . .
The leader of the successful party, however, if he has authority enough to prevail upon
his own friends to act with proper temper and moderation (which he frequently has
not), may sometimes render to his country a service much more essential and
important than the greatest victories and the most extensive conquests [of the patriot].
He may re-establish and improve the constitution, and from the very doubtful and
ambiguous character of the leader of a party, he may assume the greatest and noblest of
all characters, that of the reformer and legislator of a great state; and, by the wisdom of
his institutions, secure the internal tranquillity and happiness of his fellow-citizens for
many succeeding generations (TMS, pp. 231–232).
For Smith, this wise ‘‘reformer and legislator’’ is essential to civic progress, for
only such a leader has the character to resist the entreaties from, and stand up to, the
intimidation of faction. Only such a statesman can lead based on the principle E
Pluribus Unum. Such a government establishes justice for all.
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves
secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to
pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which
there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government (WN, p. 910).
When citizens have this confidence, society can flourish. Under such a constitution,
individual citizens feel that the system of justice is just to them and thus warrants
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their individual acceptance and adherence. This common commitment to civic ethics
increases common trust and reduces the role of government, both of which unleash
energy and creativity in an expanding market engagement.
Absent this confidence in the justice of institutions, there is no buy-in by individuals.
There is no common civic ethics to which to commit. This lack of confidence in government
increases the cost of maintaining social stability and decreases the productivity of society.
Smith cites, as an example of the extreme case of no buy-in, slaves: they have
‘‘nothing which could bind them to have any affection for their master, and the most
severe discipline was necessary to keep them to their work’’ (LJA, p. 178). For this
reason slavery is an inherently inefficient system of production.
More generally, where government is perceived as unjust, individuals will
dismiss the authority of government and willfully violate what they believe are
unjust rules. As an example of this, Smith cites the fact that the perverse incentives of
the mercantilist policies of his day encouraged smuggling.
[T]he smuggler; a person who, though no doubt highly blamable for violating the
laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and
would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so. In those corrupted
governments where there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary
expence, and great misapplication of the publick revenue, the laws which guard it are
little respected (WN, p. 898).17
In contrast, where government is trusted and respected, citizens honor that worthiness
by themselves being trustworthy: Smith cites the case of tax assessment in Hamburg
as a classic example.
At Hamburg every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state one-fourth per cent of all
that he possesses; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburg consists principally in
stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses himself,
and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain
sum of money which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth per cent of all that he
possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any
examination upon that subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with great
fidelity. In a small republic, where the people have entire confidence in their
magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and
believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious and
voluntary payment may sometimes be expected (WN, p. 850).
Trust in government may be more difficult to establish in a larger state, but a common
principle holds for all societies. As in Hamburg, government is most successful
17‘‘An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling must rise in
proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the
temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment too in
proportion to the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the
crime’’ (WN, pp. 826–827).
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‘‘where the people have entire confidence in their magistrates, are convinced of the
necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe that it will be faithfully
applied to that purpose. . ..’’ In larger societies this implies using powers of the
State as lightly, efficiently, and unintrusively as possible to carry out the necessary
functions of the State. Simple principles, but a daunting challenge to implement in
a world of competing interests. Given this challenge, Smith believed that the standard
of successful leadership is not perfection.
The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence
. . . will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed
habits and prejudices of the people; and will remedy as well as he can, the
inconveniencies which may flow from the want of those regulations which the people
are averse to submit to. When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to
ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of
laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear (TMS, p. 233).
One investment the government can make that can decrease the influence of
faction and increase the likelihood that citizens will be diligent and constructive in
their civic participation is public education.
An instructed and intelligent people . . . are always more decent and orderly than an
ignorant and stupid one.. . . They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of
seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition, and they are, upon
that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the
measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends
very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct,
it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge
rashly or capriciously concerning it (WN, p. 788).
In a constructive society, trust and security are based on mutual respect among
citizens and between the citizen and the State. It is the maturation of the citizen and
of the State together that makes the emergence of a commercial free-market society
possible. It is the trust engendered by this maturation of civic ethics and institutions
that makes it possible for individuals to enter the market system with confidence that
the competition will be a game played by just rules.
When trust is shaken, individuals pull back and the system contracts. Where trust
grows, individual energy and creativity are unleashed and the system grows. In
Smith’s vision of humankind’s progress, trust is the central theme.
V. ON THE ROLE OF FAITH IN ADAM SMITH’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Smith is first and foremost an empiricist. His examination of history is the foundation
for his argument that humankind has progressed and that trust plays a central role in
making that progress possible.
Smith’s unwavering belief that the human prospect is progress is not, however,
empirical. It is a leap of faith.
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In my book Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy (Evensky 2005), I assert that Smith is
a deist and that this belief provides the hope for his moral philosophical vision.
My assertion has not met with universal acceptance. Consider Sam Fleischacker’s
comment: ‘‘Evensky himself smoothes over these gaps and tensions in Smith by way of
an unfortunate departure from his generally careful mode of interpretation. This is his
insistence on reading the hand of a benevolent deity, and a Pollyanna-ish view of
progress, into Smith’s texts, often without a shred of evidence on which to base such an
interpretation’’ (Fleischacker 2007, p. 4). I respect Fleischacker very much. After all,
he’s insightful enough to write that among the ‘‘several books that attempt to give an
overview of Smith’s entire corpus . . . Evensky’s is the best of these’’ (Fleischacker 2007,
p. 1). So, if I didn’t persuade him regarding my deity argument, then obviously my
argument could use some development. I take this opportunity to do that development.
Trust is a constant theme in Smith’s moral philosophical analysis of the
prerequisites for progress. Faith plays no operational role in the logic of that
analysis. Faith is, however, very important to his enterprise.
Smith’s faith is the source of his hope for the human prospect, and his hope is
the source of his intellectual energy. He spent his life trying to cull from history the
principles of humankind’s progress because he believed, as a matter of faith, that the
benevolent deity had designed the universe with humankind under his special care,
and had endowed humankind with the prospect of progress: ‘‘The idea of that divine
Being, whose benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and
conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to produce the
greatest possible quantity of happiness, is certainly of all the objects of human
contemplation by far the most sublime’’ (TMS, p. 236).
Smith’s story of humankind’s history is not a Pollyanna-ish story of inexorable
progress guided by an invisible deistic hand. Every chapter of that history includes twists
and turns, stagnation and decline, and countless tragedies. Smith’s deity doesn’t guide
progress. Smith’s deity has designed the opportunity for progress into the human
condition. Seizing that opportunity is humankind’s responsibility. As Bittermann writes:
Smith along with his contemporaries expected the world to become more intelligent,
more tolerant, and more humane with the decline of superstition and the advance of
knowledge.. . . Smith was undeniably a ‘progressivist’.... Yet progress was not
automatic. He did not look to Providence for direct aid in the economic and moral
improvement of mankind. Man had to act on his own behalf ... Smith’s own work as
economist and philosopher were [sic] intended, most probably, as contributions
toward this progress (Bittermann1940, pp. 733–734).
Smith was dedicated to this work based on his faith that gave him hope, and one
hears the voice of this faith and hope consistently in Smith’s work.
For example, Smith makes it clear that as a purely ethical standard, personal
culpability is a matter of intention. But as a practical matter, assessment of intention
is beyond human capabilities. We have no window into the soul of another.
Actions, therefore, . . . are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and
approved objects of human punishment and resentment. Sentiments, designs,
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affections . . . are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every
human jurisdiction, and are reserved for the cognizance of his own unerring
tribunal.. . . [Here, as is often his theme,] every part of nature, when attentively
surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its Author, and we may
admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of man
(TMS, pp. 104–106).
More generally, with respect to our moral sentiments, Smith reminds us that there
is design.
The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have
been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them
into existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine
benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him . . . [B]y acting according to the
dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for
promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to
co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of
Providence. By acting otherways, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some
measure, the scheme which the Author of nature has established for the happiness
and perfection of the world. . . (TMS, pp. 165–166).
He is indeed quite explicit about faith in the design.
In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the
ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or animal
body, admire how every thing is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of
nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species. But in these,
and in all such objects, we still distinguish the efficient from the final cause of their
several motions and organizations. The digestion of the food, the circulation of the
blood, and the secretion of the several juices which are drawn from it, are operations
all of them necessary for the great purposes of animal life. Yet we never endeavour to
account for them from those purposes as from their efficient causes, nor imagine that
the blood circulates, or that the food digests of its own accord, and with a view or
intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion. The wheels of a watch are all
admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made, the pointing of the hour. All
their various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this effect. If they
were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better.
Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watch-maker. . . .
[Having developed this design image to explain the relationship between efficient
and final causes in nature, he turns to efficient and final cause in the human
condition.] But though, in accounting for the operation of bodies, we never fail to
distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those
of the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another.
When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and
enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason,
as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those
ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of
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God. Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects
which are ascribed to it; and the system of human nature seems to be more simple
and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from
a single principle [reason] (TMS, p. 87).
This vision of the design would make Cleanthes, David Hume’s advocate for the
design argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, proud.
There are numerous places in Smith’s work that directly and clearly attribute
the design of the universe to the benevolent deity, the author of nature.18 Smith sees
the analogy, he believes in the design, but he does not make Cleanthes’ case for
analogy as proof of design. It is not necessary, and in fact it diminishes the notion of
faith. For Smith, faith is a leap of imagination.
Smith does not believe anyone has the vision to see into the study of the deity and
spy the blueprint of the design. He knows he can only imagine, he cannot know, the
principles of the design.19 He appreciates that there are mysteries beyond his
comprehension. Indicative of the fact that his faith in the design does not represent ‘‘a
Pollyanna-ish view of progress’’ is the mystery of human misery. Why in the course
of humankind’s progress would a benevolent deity so horrifically strew the path with
so many failures and so much suffering of so many good people?20 This is a mystery,
but it did not shake his faith.21
In Hume’s Dialogues, the skeptic Philo who makes the case against Cleanthes’
design argument does so by undermining the argument by analogy.
18A reviewer wrote:
If Smith had not hidden his views on religious beliefs, hinted at strongly in Astronomy
(‘pusillanimous superstition’) throughout his life from 1744, Adam Smith would have
remained unknown, hence he wrote the way he did to appear conformist in religion, but
managed to do so by appearing to be ‘Christian’, ‘Providentialist’, ‘Deist’, ‘Stoic’, and
a sympathiser with ‘Natural Religion’, and all five at the same time (!) in ‘Moral Sentiments’.
He left a confusing trail deliberately; he did it so well that many scholars today still have not
seen what he was up to.
This suggests that Smith was a religious skeptic from his early days and played a lifelong strategic
game to disguise his true beliefs. I believe a more textured view of Smith, one consistent with his
biographical circumstances and the evolution of his work (and his queasiness about publishing the
Dialogues for Hume), is that his view of religion evolved along with, but beyond, that of the church of his
contemporaries (see Sher [1985]) (a church he admired very much) from a traditional view (like his
mother’s) to one that was more in line with Philo’s assertion in the Dialogues that belief in the deity is not
a matter of doctrinal proof but of faith.
19See Evensky (2005, ch. 1) for more on the role of imagination in Smith’s inquiries.
20He cites ‘‘[t]he unfortunate Calas’’ (TMS, p. 120) as an example.
21
Every religion that acknowledges a God who is all-powerful, all-wise, all-knowing, and
perfectly good faces the so-called problem of evil. How is the abundant evidence of unwilled
suffering in sentient beings (physical evil), and of human wickedness and its consequences
(moral evil), to be reconciled with the divine attributes? (Why does God allow cancer, war,
injustice, and so on?) Answers that diminish any of the attributes are rejected as heterodox. . . .
An inquiry that seeks to demonstrate the possible coexistence of all the divine attributes is
known as theodicy (Waterman 2002, p. 916, emphasis in original).
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When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can
infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this
I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the
objects, as in the present case [the universe], are single, individual, without parallel, or
specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with
a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art
like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were
requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely,
that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. . . . Can you
pretend to shew any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation
of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first
arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have
you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first
appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience,
and deliver your theory (Hume 1947, pp. 149–151, emphasis in original).
But while Philo rejects the empirical case for the design argument, he does not
reject the notion of the design.
Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. Formerly,
when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed
all my sceptical and metaphysical subtilty to elude your grasp. In many views of the
universe and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes
strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they
really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever
possible for us to repose any weight on them. But there is no view of human life, or
of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer
the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power
and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone (Hume 1947,
pp. 201–202, emphasis added).
This, I believe, is Smith’s position. We need not have proof to have faith. Indeed, it
diminishes faith to require proof because it reduces a being of ‘‘infinite benevolence,
conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom’’ to the finite realm of empirical
inquiry.
In the sixth edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1790, Smith
removes a long passage of the traditional religious language about God, repentance,
doctrines of revelation, and atonement (TMS, pp. 91–92, note c-c) and replaces it with
a single sentence: ‘‘In every religion, and in every superstition that the world has
ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place
provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just’’
(TMS, p. 91).22
22Smith writes in his correspondence to Gilbert Elliot on 10 October 1759: ‘‘Man is accountable to God
and his fellow creatures. But tho’ he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, in the order of time, he
must necessarily conceive himself as accountable to his fellow creatures, before he can form any idea of
the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will judge his conduct’’ (Correspondence, p. 52).
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Even as Smith’s own conception of religion becomes less institutional, he clings
to his faith for its psychic utility, for the hope it offers. Recognizing that all too often
the judgments of this life can be terribly unjust (again note his example of the
injustice perpetrated on Jean Calas in the name of religion [TMS, p. 120]), he writes
in his revisions to the sixth edition:
Our happiness in this life is thus, upon many occasions, dependent upon the humble
hope and expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in
human nature; which can alone support its lofty ideas of its own dignity.... That there
is a world to come ... is a doctrine, in every respect so venerable, so comfortable to
the weakness, so flattering to the grandure of human nature, that the virtuous man
who has the misfortune to doubt of it, cannot possibly avoid wishing most earnestly
and anxiously to believe it (TMS, p. 132).
This leap of faith, this act of imagination, provides the virtuous man who doubts
the institutional doctrine of divine judgment with the tranquility and serenity that
come with an abiding hope that justice will be done in the ‘‘life to come.’’ It is this
leap of faith that affords Smith hope with respect to the individual human prospect. It
is this same leap of faith that motivates his hope for, and energizes his commitment
to, humankind’s prospect as progress.23
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